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trial tactics

One Person’s Statement to
Prove Another’s Actions
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

I

t has been long established—since Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285
(1892)—that statements of an individual’s
present intention to do a future act may be admitted to prove that the individual did in fact do
the act. Dictum in Hillmon stated that one person’s statement of a present intent to do a future
act with another person could be used to prove
that the declarant did the intended act and did
it with the other person mentioned in the statement. When Congress enacted the Federal Rules
of Evidence into law in 1975, a House of Representatives committee report indicated a desire to
limit the use of a hearsay statement of a present
intent to do a future act to prove the declarant’s
actions, not those of a third person. The Senate
report was silent on the matter, and whether the
Hillmon dictum remained good law was not resolved as the Federal Rules were enacted into law.
The hearsay issue of whether to limit use of a
declarant’s statement of an intention to do a future
act to prove the declarant’s actions alone or also the
actions of another person remains alive in both federal and state courts. Resolution of the hearsay issue
is more important today than some years ago since
the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause extends only to
testimonial statements. (Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).) Since few statements of a present intent to do a future act are testimonial, the only
protection for a defendant in a criminal case from
having a declarant’s statements used to prove the
defendant’s actions is the hearsay rule.
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State v. McLaughlin: An Illustrative Case

The importance of the hearsay rule to resolution
of this issue is well illustrated by State v. McLaughlin, 14 A.3d 720 (N.J. 2011). The case arose as a
result of an alleged plan by the defendant, Eduardo McLaughlin, his brother Pablo, and a friend
named Miguel Serrano to rob a grade-school friend
of the defendant, Thong Ming Hyunh. Hyunh was
employed in a check cashing business that often
transported large sums of cash. The defendant,
along with the others, arranged for the defendant
to ride with Hyunh in Hyunh’s sister’s van after
he picked up approximately $17,000 in cash. The
two drove to where Pablo lived with his girlfriend.
When they arrived, Pablo and Serrano were already there. A struggle ensued while the money
was counted, and the defendant and Serrano killed
Hyunh and divided the money. The two bought an
all-terrain vehicle and drove the van to a secluded
location where they set it on fire before dumping
Hyunh’s body.
The police responded to the van fire and traced
the van to the victim’s sister, who reported her
brother missing the following day. As a result of
discovering that the defendant and Hyunh had
several telephone conversations immediately before Hyunh disappeared, the police interviewed
the defendant. The defendant said that he and
Hyunh had planned to go out for drinks, but
Hyunh had not called back.
The investigation led the police to Serrano.
They searched Serrano’s home and recovered a
large sum of cash along with a bracelet identified
as belonging to Hyunh. Serrano’s girlfriend, Jessica Pabón, told the police that she had seen the
defendant wearing that bracelet. More cash was
discovered at the home of Serrano’s mother.
Eduardo McLaughlin was tried alone for firstdegree murder, first-degree felony murder, and
other crimes. The jury convicted the defendant of
aggravated manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of murder), felony murder, robbery, hindering apprehension, and conspiracy.

The Evidence Issue

The prosecution called Jessica Pabón as a witness
and asked her whether Serrano had told her if he
was planning the robbery with someone else. Defense counsel objected, the trial judge overruled
the objection, and Pabón testified that Serrano
said that he was planning the robbery with “Eddie,” the defendant, and that he and the defendant
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were going to watch the victim to see what he “did
throughout the day, something like that.” The trial
court admitted the testimony as a coconspirator
declaration. On appeal, the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court held that the coconspirator exception was inapplicable because the
statements were not made in furtherance of the
planned robbery. That court determined, however,
that the statements were admissible under the “state
of mind” exception, New Jersey Rule of Evidence
803(c)(3). The New Jersey exception is virtually
the same as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and
creates a hearsay exception not conditioned on unavailability for a “statement made in good faith of
the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
defendant’s petition for certification to review
whether Serrano’s hearsay statements, as testified
to by Jessica Pabón, were admissible under New
Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(3).

The Available Approaches

The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the
state had recognized a “state of mind” exception to
the hearsay rule in Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495,
541 (E. & A. 1878), 14 years before Hillmon, and
Hillmon actually cited Hunter. That is the exception
codified as New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c)(3).
The court looked to what other United States
courts had done when a declarant’s statement of
a present intent to do a future act with another
person is offered against the other person and
found three general approaches to the problem.
Some courts narrowly apply Hillmon so that a
declarant’s statement may only be admitted to
prove the declarant’s subsequent conduct. Other
courts take a more expansive approach and uniformly allow admission of the statement to prove
the subsequent conduct of both the declarant and
nondeclarant in all instances. Still other courts allow admission of the statement as proof of the
subsequent conduct of the nondeclarant if there
is independent evidence to corroborate the hearsay statement as to the nondeclarant.

The Holding

The court reversed the defendant’s convictions
and held that:

[t]he ‘state of mind’ hearsay exception
should be construed narrowly, focusing specifically on the declarant’s state of mind and
whether that state of mind is directly relevant to the issues at trial. Because the state
of mind of the declarant of the hearsay offered here was not directly relevant to the
prosecution of defendant and the hearsay
statement itself, without redaction, imputed
to defendant the intent to commit a crime,
its admission was error.
(McLaughlin, 14 A.3d at 189.)

The Reasoning

The court emphasized that the first step in determining admissibility of a declarant’s statement is
deciding whether it is relevant. In the instant case,
the court concluded that Serrano’s statement was
irrelevant because his state of mind was not at issue in the case. This, by itself, would have been
sufficient to warrant reversal, but the court indicated a desire to provide clarity for future cases.
Thus, it went on to hold that, even if relevant,
a declarant’s statement of a present intention to
do a future act must be redacted if it refers to another person against whom the statement is offered. The court reasoned as follows:
This must be so because, as State v. Roach,
146 N.J. 208, 224, 680 A.2d 634, cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1021, 117 S. Ct. 540, 136 L. Ed.
2d 424 (1996), explains, “[i]t is well-settled
that the admission of the statement of a
co-defendant at a joint trial that implicates
defendant without the right of cross-examination constitutes prejudicial error.” (citing
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.
Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968); State v.
Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965)). . . .
If a hearsay declarant unavailable for crossexamination directly implicates a defendant, the principles that inform Bruton and
Roach also guide the redaction process to be
followed in the context of a state of mind
hearsay statement that identifies a non-declarant defendant. As this Court has noted,
“limiting instructions [to the jury] are, as a
matter of constitutional law, insufficient to
overcome the prejudice to a remaining defendant in a joint trial in which an unavailable codefendant inculpates the remaining
defendant[.]” State v. Meléndez, 129 N.J. 48,
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57, 609 A.2d 1 (1992) (citing Bruton, supra,
391 U.S. at 124, 88 S. Ct. at 1621, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 478). Therefore, the question becomes
what—in order to insure fairness in the proceedings and stout fealty to the constitutional guarantee that a defendant is entitled
to confront and cross-examine those who
bear witness against him—must a court do
in order to redact or “sanitize” a co-defendant’s hearsay statement that implicates the
non-testifying defendant?
(Id. at 733–34.)
The court’s answer was as follows:
We therefore express what Meléndez, supra,
129 N.J. at 57–60, 609 A.2d 1, implies: a nontestifying declarant’s state of mind hearsay
statement concerning future acts by the nondeclarant/defendant properly must be redacted to omit references to the non-declarant/
defendant in order to satisfy both Evidence
Rule 803(c)(3) as well as the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const.
amend. VI, and its parallel in the New Jersey
Constitution, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.
(Id. at 735.)

The Reasoning Applied

The court applied its reasoning to the facts of the
case as follows:
Had Serrano’s hearsay statements been
offered during Serrano’s own trial, the
statements would have been admissible as
against him. See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) (excepting party’s own statements from hearsay
rule). However, in a trial where defendant
stands alone, those same statements addressing Serrano’s state of mind in respect
of defendant’s possible future acts are not
relevant to a central issue in the determination of defendant’s guilt. And, at their core,
those hearsay statements are unreliable: Serrano’s hearsay statements concerning defendant as offered through Jessica Pabón’s testimony cannot be cross-examined, and the
absence of an effective substitute for crossexamination fails to satisfy the “good faith”
requirement of Evidence Rule 803(c)(3) and
is fatal to their admissibility. Defendant—
who made no statements of a presently ex-

isting state of mind—cannot otherwise be
liable vicariously for the statements made
by Serrano in respect of Serrano’s state of
mind, particularly where, as here, there was
no showing that defendant knew of or otherwise ratified Serrano’s hearsay statements.
As a result, the admission of those hearsay
statements without redaction and over objection—thereby allowing the jury to infer
that Serrano’s hearsay statements proved
that defendant acted as Serrano claimed to
his girlfriend—constitutes reversible error
that commands a retrial.
(Id. at 735–36.)

The Reasoning Analyzed; Some Lessons

1. The court was probably wrong in concluding
that Serrano’s statement of intent was irrelevant in
the defendant’s trial. Had Serrano testified and admitted participation, his statement might well have
been irrelevant. But, assuming that he did not testify (and the court did not suggest he did), then the
government was required to prove how the victim
died, which meant it had to prove that Serrano was
there with the defendant. Thus, Serrano’s statement
of a present intention to rob the victim was probative of the fact that he did actually participate in the
robbery that led to murder. Even if the statement is
redacted to remove any mention of the defendant, it
is relevant to the prosecution’s case.
2. The court’s references to the US Supreme
Court’s opinion in Bruton as well as the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s own opinions in Roach, Young,
and Meléndez fail to indicate that all of the opinions preceded the decision in Crawford. It is virtually certain that Serrano’s statements to Jessica
Pabón were not testimonial statements. Therefore,
the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause is not
applicable. Of course, the New Jersey Supreme
Court may rely on the New Jersey Constitution to
provide more confrontation rights than are guaranteed by the US Constitution. But, it is important
for readers of the opinion to recognize that redaction is not required by the Sixth Amendment.
3. The fact that the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause does not apply drives home the
point that the hearsay determination is critical.
If Serrano’s statements are not admissible under
evidence rules such as New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(c) (3) or Federal Rule of Evidence 803
(3), then redaction is not only appropriate, but required—not as a result of the application of the
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Sixth Amendment but as a fair application of the
hearsay rule. After all, there is no way a limiting
instruction would work in a case like the instant
case, given the fact that there is a single defendant
who is not the hearsay declarant.
4. Those state courts that admit statements
like Serrano’s—with or without corroboration—
to prove that he acted and did so along with defendant McLaughlin may continue to do so. Af-

ter all, they have the authority to interpret their
evidence rules as they see fit, and absent a state
constitutional problem with admission of the
evidence, the fact that it is nontestimonial means
that federal law is irrelevant.
5. As for federal courts, they must rely on the
law of the respective circuit until such time as the
US Supreme Court decides to decide on the reach
of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). n
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